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H I G H L I G H T S
 A ﬁnite population playing two 2-strategy games is investigated.
 The stochastic process is approximated by stochastic differential equations.
 Speciﬁc linkages between the strategies of the games emerge by ﬁnite size effects.
 Several numerical simulations conﬁrm the theoretical consequents.
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a b s t r a c t
Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a ﬁnite population has been investigated in
this study. Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic
replicator dynamics under the assumption that the population size is inﬁnite. However, in reality,
population sizes are ﬁnite. Recently, stochastic processes in ﬁnite populations have been introduced into
evolutionary games in order to study ﬁnite size effects in evolutionary game dynamics. However, most of
these studies focus on populations playing only single games. In this study, we investigate a ﬁnite
population with two games and show that a ﬁnite population playing two games tends to evolve toward
a speciﬁc direction to form particular linkages between the strategies of the two games.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is a fundamental mathematical frame-
work that enables the investigation of evolution in biological, social,
and economic systems, and has been successfully applied to the study
of the Darwinian process of natural selection (Lewontin, 1961;
Maynard Smith, 1972, 1974, 1982; Maynard Smith and Price, 1973;
Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Sugden, 1986; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998;
Nowak, 2006; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004). The Darwinian process is
an inherently frequency-dependent process. The ﬁtness of an indivi-
dual is not only linked to environmental conditions but also tightly
coupled with the frequencies of its competitors. Replicator dynamics,
introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978), is a system of deterministic
differential equations, which model the frequency-dependent selec-
tion. It is the most popular model for the evolution of the frequencies
of strategies in a population. However, this model intrinsically assumes
that population sizes are inﬁnite and it fails to consider stochastic
effects.
Recently, various frequency-dependent stochastic processes in
ﬁnite populations have been introduced into evolutionary games
in order to study the ﬁnite size effect in evolutionary game
dynamics (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004; Fudenberg
et al., 2003; Szabó and Töke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2006; Szabó and
Hauert, 2002; Noble et al., 2011). One such stochastic process is
the frequency-dependent Moran process (Nowak et al., 2004).
This process is a stochastic birth-death process and comprises two
procedures: (1) birth, in which a player is chosen as a parent to
reproduce with a probability proportional to its ﬁtness, and its
offspring has the same strategy as the parent, and (2) death, in
which the offspring replaces a randomly chosen individual. Thus,
the population size N is strictly constant in both these procedures.
Another process is the local update process (Traulsen et al., 2005).
In the local update process, one individual is chosen randomly,
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who compares his/her payoff to that of another randomly chosen
individual, and the probability of the former switching to the latter
strategy is based on difference between their payoffs. Repeating
the process N-times is regarded as the unit time. These models have
enabled many analyses of evolutionary processes and have provided
considerable insight into the stochastic effects in evolutionary game
dynamics (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004; Fudenberg et al.,
2003; Traulsen et al., 2005; Ficici and Pollack, 2007; Ohtsuki et al.,
2007). However, most of the previous studies have only focused on a
single game with a maximum of two to three strategies. In most
systems that are of interest to us, we can see that players are playing
many games simultaneously, such as biological games in ecosystems
and social games in human societies. Such a situation where players
play several games simultaneously is termed multigame (Hashimoto,
2006). Only recently, a few studies focus on suchmultigame situations.
Bednar and Page study a population repeating a two game ensemble
with a framework of repeated games in the context of the emergence
of cultural behavior (Bednar and Page, 2007). In Cressman et al. (2000)
and Hashimoto (2006), replicator equations of plural games are
investigated. With an inﬁnite population, the multigame effect has
been investigated; when the numbers of strategies of the games are
more than two, the fate of the frequencies of the strategies in a single
game may change dramatically with or without another game in
general (Chamberland and Cressman, 2000; Hashimoto, 2006). Even if
one of the games has Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) (Maynard
Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), the ESS point may be
destabilized (Hashimoto, 2006). However, when both games have two
strategies, their fates coincide with the fates of single games
(Cressman et al., 2000). However, in a ﬁnite population, the manner
in which multigame inﬂuence the dynamics remains unclear. As
mentioned in Hashimoto (2006), a phase space of multigame
dynamics consists of invariant manifolds that are neutral to their
transverse directions. With such neutrality in a dynamical system,
adding noise may play a signiﬁcant role in the dynamics. Stochastic
noise moves the system state in the neutral directions without
resistance by the deterministic ﬂow. Therefore, the system state
migrates between the invariant manifolds of the deterministic
dynamics. Intuitively, this migration could be expected to be a simple
random walk. However, a non-trivial behavior results from the
combination of the deterministic ﬂow and the stochastic noise. In this
paper, we apply this motivation to the simplest case, multigame
consisting of two 2-strategy games and stochasticity brought by
demographic noise.
2. Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games
In this section, we investigate evolutionary game dynamics
with two 2-strategy games in a ﬁnite population. Let us consider
a population playing two games, game-α and game-β, simulta-
neously. The reward matrices of the games are given by
A¼
a11 a12
a21 a22
 !
; B¼
b11 b12
b21 b22
 !
:
The players can be divided into 22 groups, with group (i,j)
comprising players who play strategy-i for game-α and strategy-j for
game-β. We assume that a player's payoff for game-α and that for
game-β additively inﬂuence his/her payoff. A player of strategy-ði; jÞ
playing against a player of strategy-ðk; lÞ will obtain aik through game-
α and bjl through game-β and accordingly be rewarded aikþbjl.
Let xij denote the frequency of players playing strategy-(i,j)
(∑xij ¼ 1). Furthermore, the frequency of players playing strategy-i
in game-α is denoted by yi and that of strategy-j in game-β by zj:
y¼
y1
y2
 !
¼
x11þx12
x21þx22
 !
; z¼
z1
z2
 !
¼
x11þx21
x12þx22
 !
:
If every individual interacts with a representative sample of the
population, then the expected payoff for an (i,j)-strategy player is
determined by f ij ¼∑k;lðaikþbjlÞxkl and the average payoff of the
population is f ¼∑xklf kl. Using y and z, these equations can be
rewritten as follows:
f ij ¼ ðAyÞiþðBzÞj; f ¼ tyAyþ tzBz:
Two-strategy games ða11a21
a12
a22
Þ can be classiﬁed into three types
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998): (1) a114a21, a124a22 or a11oa21,
a12oa22, (2) a114a21, a12oa22, (3) a11oa21, a124a22. In type-
(1), one strategy always gets a higher payoff than the other
strategy regardless of their frequencies. Thus, the advantageous
strategy dominates over the other regardless of the initial state.
In type-(2), when the frequency of one strategy is small, the
strategy gets a lower payoff than the other and decreases its
frequency. Therefore, both the homogeneous states are stable.
Although a coexistence equilibrium exists, it is unstable. Depend-
ing on the initial state, the system state converges into one of the
two homogeneous states. Type-(3) game is called Hawk and Dove
game which was initially introduced by Maynard Smith (1982).
In type-(3), when the frequency of one strategy is small, the strategy
gets a higher payoff than the other and increases its frequency. Both
the homogeneous states are unstable and a coexistence equilibrium
exists and is stable. In either type, (1) and (2), the evolution simply
results in a homogeneous population. In such a population, all
individuals play an identical strategy and this situation can make
no difference from a situation in which the population does not play
the game. With such games, the plurality of games in a multigame
situation does not make any sense. Thus, we concentrate on type-
(3) games in this study.
For a reason mentioned above, we assume that both game-α
and game-β are type-(3) in this paper. A coexistence equilibrium
point exists and it is stable in each game. This ensures
a11a21o0; a22a12o0;
b11b21o0; b22b12o0:
Furthermore, we assume that the stabilities of the equilibrium
points are sufﬁciently strong. At a coexistence equilibrium point,
all strategies obtain the same payoffs. Let p¼ tðp;1pÞ and
q¼ tðq;1qÞ denote the coexistence equilibrium points in game-
α and game-β, respectively. p and q are determined by
p¼ ða22a12Þ=ða11a12a21þa22Þ and q¼ ðb22b12Þ=ðb11b12
b21þb22Þ. Note that in a multigame situation, system states that
satisfy the coexistence equilibria in both the games are not a single
point but rather points on a line determined by y¼ p and z¼ q.
Here, this line is termed as L (see Fig. 2).
2.1. Inﬁnite-population model
In an inﬁnite population, the replicator equation that corre-
sponds to this multigame situation is given by
_xij ¼ xijðf ij f Þ
¼ xijfðAyÞiþðBzÞj tyAy tzBzg: ð1Þ
Behaviors in this system are rather simple. This differential equation
leads to
d
dt
x11x22
x12x21
¼ x11x22
x12x21
ðf 11þ f 22 f 12 f 21Þ ¼ 0:
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Thus, x11x22=x12x21 is constant in time evolution and this implies
that x11x22=x12x21 ¼ ðconstÞ forms an invariant manifold. Some
invariant manifolds are shown in Fig. 1. Additionally, in Fig. 2, four
orbits that follow Eq. (1) are plotted as examples. An orbit starting
at time t¼0 from a point ðx11ð0Þx21ð0Þ
x12ð0Þ
x22ð0ÞÞ will move on an invariant
manifold determined by x11x22=x12x21 ¼ x11ð0Þx22ð0Þ= x12ð0Þx21ð0Þ
and will eventually converge to the intersection point of the
invariant manifold and L. Every point on L is a ﬁxed point and is
stable to the transverse direction of L. Furthermore, because every
point on L is a ﬁxed point, the stability to the direction of L is
neutral.
2.2. Finite-population model
In a ﬁnite population, stochastic effects by the demographic
noise constantly perturb the system state. Selection pressures
bring the system state to L, however, stochastic effects prevent
the system state from staying on L. In this study, we are interested
in determining the motion of the system state in L direction.
From a naive intuition, it may seem to be a simple random walk
because the stability in this direction is neutral in a systemwith an
inﬁnite population. However, we ﬁnd that ﬁnite size effect breaks
this neutrality and a ﬂow emerges along L. Consequently, the
system state tends to evolve toward a speciﬁc direction of L.
As mentioned above, several processes are proposed for game
dynamics in ﬁnite populations. In this paper, we concentrate on
the local updating process proposed by Traulsen et al. (2005).
In the local update process, a player b is chosen randomly and his/
her payoff is compared to that of another randomly chosen
individual a. The probability of player-b switching his/her strategy
to the player-a's strategy is given by
γðf ðaÞ; f ðbÞÞ ¼
1
2
þω
2
ðf ðaÞ  f ðbÞÞ;
where f ðaÞ and f ðbÞ are the payoffs of player-a and player-b,
respectively. Furthermore, ωðZ0Þ measures the strength of the
selection pressure. Selection is weak when ωo1, the process is
dominated by random updating and payoff differences have a
negligible effect on the process. For larger ω, the selection
intensity increases. However, an upper limit is imposed on ω by
the following requirement: 0rγr1. The probability of selecting
an (i,j)-strategy player as player-a is xij and the probability of
selecting a (k,l)-strategy player as player-b is xkl. Therefore, the
probability, Pði;jÞðk;lÞ, that the number of (i,j)-strategy players increases
by one and that of (k,l)-strategy players decreases by one in a
single process is given by
Pði;jÞðk;lÞ ¼ xijxklγðf ij; f klÞ ¼ xijxkl
1
2
þω
2
ðf ij f klÞ
 
: ð2Þ
The probability that the system state does not change is 1
∑ði;jÞa ðk;lÞP
ði;jÞ
ðk;lÞ.
It is noteworthy that in the limit of N-1, this process
represents a replicator equation. The expected change of xij in a
single process is as follows:
〈Δxij〉¼
1
N
∑
ðk;lÞ
Pði;jÞðk;lÞ P
ðk;lÞ
ði;jÞ ¼
ω
N
xijðf ij f Þ:
Because the process is iterated N times in a unit time, a single
process takes time Δt ¼ 1=N. In the limit of N-1, the replicator
equation is derived as
_xij ¼ lim
N-1
〈Δxij〉
Δt ¼ωxijðf ij f Þ:
Therefore, the stochastic process indeed implements a replicator
equation in a ﬁnite population with stochasticity of demographic
noise.
In the process, the system state ultimately reaches one of the
four homogeneous states (i.e., the states that all players have the
same strategy) after long transient, and these four states corre-
spond to the four vertexes of the tetrahedron. However, the time
taken to reach such a homogeneous state is extremely long,
especially in a large population, because of the stability of coex-
istence equilibrium points (Antal and Scheuring, 2006). In con-
trast, extinction of a single strategy resulting from a random walk
along L occurs in a short time-scale. Similar to the inﬁnite-
population case, ﬁrst, the system state is immediately brought to
the vicinity of L from its initial point by the selection pressure
roughly along the manifold that the initial state is located.
Subsequently, the system state ﬂuctuates around L because of
the stochastic effects. Eventually, one of the strategies become
extinct, implying that the system state has reached one of the
boundaries of L. Strictly speaking, this is inaccurate. In fact, the
system state reaches a point on a boundary plane when a single
strategy is extinct and this location is not necessarily a boundary of
L but a point close to it. Following this, the system state ﬂuctuates
on the boundary plane around the intersection point of L and the
boundary plane. In Fig. 3, an evolutionary path from an initial state
to a state in which a single strategy is eliminated is plotted. Finally,
in the limit of time evolution, two strategies will be eliminated,
that is, the population becomes homogeneous. This is the absorb-
ing state of the system and it takes an enormously long time
because of the stability of the coexistence equilibrium. Therefore,
the boundaries of L can be considered as absorbing states for a
short time-scale evolution. As mentioned above, we are not
Fig. 1. Since ∑xij ¼ 1 and xijZ0 hold, a system state can be represented by a point in a tetrahedron. Five examples of invariant manifolds in the replicator equation are
plotted. x11x22=x12x21 is (a) 125, (b)
1
5, (c) 1, (d) 5, and (e) 25. The vertexes represent the system states that all players have the same strategy. e1 represents one of the four
vertexes: ðx11 ; x12 ; x21; x22Þ ¼ ð1;0;0;0Þ. e2, e3, and e4 represent ð0;1;0;0Þ, ð0;0;1;0Þ, and ð0;0;0;1Þ, respectively.
Fig. 2. A set of coexistence equilibrium points in this system forms a line indicated
by L. Four orbits in a deterministic system with an inﬁnite population are plotted.
All these orbits start from points on an identical invariant manifold, which is
represented by a curved surface. They move on the manifold and converge to the
intersection point of L and the manifold.
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interested in determining how the homogeneous states are
reached but rather how the boundaries of L are reached. This
rather literary illustration of the system behavior raises following
questions: Is the movement of the system state along L just a
simple random walk? If not, which absorbing state has a higher
likelihood of being observed? This paper is aimed to answer these
questions.
2.3. Variable transformation
To investigate the behavior of the system we here adopt a
variable transformation ðx11x21
x12
x22
Þ↦ðr;u; vÞ:
x11 x12
x21 x22
 !
¼
pq pð1qÞ
ð1pÞq ð1pÞð1qÞ
 !
þ r
2
1 1
1 1
 
þu
2
1 1
1 1
 
þv
2
1 1
1 1
 
:
ð3Þ
Note that the origin of ðr;u; vÞ-coordinate depends on p and q.
Since Eq. (3) leads to y¼ pþuð 11Þ and z¼ qþvð 11Þ, u and v
represents the deviations from equilibria in game-α and game-β,
respectively. L is represented by u¼ v¼ 0. Therefore, r-axis is
identical to L. A sample trajectory in ðr;u; vÞ-coordinate is plotted
in Fig. 4. A Markov process on ðr;u; vÞ-space is led from the
transition probabilities (Eq. (2)) and this variable transformation.
For an example, with a probability of Pð1;1Þð1;2Þ, if a ð1;2Þ-strategy
player is replaced by ð1;1Þ-strategy player, then r and v increase by
1=N and u remains unchanged. Another example, if a ð2;2Þ-strat-
egy player is replaced by ð1;1Þ-strategy player with a probability of
Pð1;1Þð2;2Þ, then u and v increase by 1=N and r remains unchanged.
2.4. Langevin equations
To analyze the dynamics of a large but ﬁnite population, it is
effective to approximate the dynamics using Langevin equations
(Helbing, 1996; Traulsen et al., 2005, 2006, 2012). The objective of
this study is to determine the time evolution of r; the ﬁrst step to
this is to derive the Langevin equations for ðr;u; vÞ by approximat-
ing the Markov process, assuming that the population size N is
sufﬁciently large.
From Eq. (3), the changes of r, u, and v in a single process are
represented by those of xij as
Δr¼ 1
2
ðΔx11þΔx22Δx12Δx21Þ;
Δu¼ 1
2
ðΔx11þΔx12Δx21Δx22Þ;
Δv¼ 1
2
ðΔx11þΔx21Δx12Δx22Þ:
Thus, in a single process, r increases by 1=N if a player of strategy-
(1,1) or (2,2) replaces strategy-(1,2) or (2,1) and decreases by 1=N if
a player of strategy-(1,2) or (2,1) replaces strategy-(1,1) or (2,2) .
Then, the expected change of r in a single process is given as
〈Δr〉¼ 1
N
grðr;u; vÞ ¼
1
N
∑
i
ka l
Pði;iÞðk;lÞ P
ðk;lÞ
ði;iÞ :
In the same manner, the expected changes of u and v are
respectively given as
〈Δu〉¼ 1
N
guðr;u; vÞ ¼
1
N
∑
k;l
Pð1;kÞð2;lÞ P
ð2;lÞ
ð1;kÞ;
〈Δv〉¼ 1
N
gvðr;u; vÞ ¼
1
N
∑
k;l
Pðk;1Þðl;2Þ P
ðl;2Þ
ðk;1Þ:
These are used for the drift terms in the Langevin equations. Based
on a simple calculation using Eq. (2) and the variable transforma-
tion Eq. (3), gr, gu, and gv are given by
grðr;u; vÞ ¼ω
h
Φu pð1pÞð12pÞruþ r
2
ð12pÞ
n
u
2
ð12pÞð12qÞþv
2
o
þΨv qð1qÞð12qÞrvþ r
2
ð12qÞ
n
v
2
ð12pÞð12qÞþu
2
oi
; ð4Þ
guðr;u; vÞ ¼ω ΦuðpþuÞð1puÞþΨv
r
2
uvþu
2
ð12qÞþv
2
ð12pÞ
n oh i
;
ð5Þ
gvðr;u; vÞ ¼ω ΨvðqþvÞð1qvÞþΦu
r
2
uvþu
2
ð12qÞþv
2
ð12pÞ
n oh i
;
ð6Þ
respectively, where Φ¼ a11þa22a12a21, Ψ ¼ b11þb22
b12b21. Note that the stability of the equilibrium points in the
two games yields Φo0, Ψo0. Moreover, the expected values of
their quadratics are also given. For an example, both u and v
increase by 1=N if a strategy-(1,1) player replaces a strategy-(2,2)
player and decreases by 1=N if a strategy-(2,2) player replaces a
strategy-(1,1) player. And u increases and v decreases by 1=N if a
strategy-(1,2) player replaces a strategy-(2,1) player and u
decreases and v increases by 1=N if a strategy-(2,1) player replaces
a strategy-(1,2) player. Therefore, 〈ΔuΔv〉 is given as ð1=N2Þ
∑ka lP
ðk;kÞ
ðl;lÞ P
ðl;kÞ
ðk;lÞ. Other quadratics are also derived in the same
Fig. 3. A trajectory in a stochastic systemwith a ﬁnite population is plotted. The system
state is brought to L due to the selection pressure in the same way as the inﬁnite-
population model. However, in contrast to the case of an inﬁnite population, stochastic
effects prevent the system state from staying on L, and it ﬂuctuates around L. RL and RH
represent the boundary points of L. Eventually, the system state reaches one of them.
Fig. 4. A sample trajectory in ðr;u; vÞ-coordinate. r-axis is identical to the line L
indicated in Fig. 3. The trajectory makes its way toward the r-axis and subsequently
ﬂuctuates around it. Eventually, it reaches one of the boundaries of L.
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manner:
〈ðΔrÞ2〉¼ 1
N2
hrrðr;u; vÞ ¼ 1
N2
∑
i
ka l
Pði;iÞðk;lÞ þP
ðk;lÞ
ði;iÞ ;
〈ðΔuÞ2〉¼ 1
N2
huuðr;u; vÞ ¼ 1
N2
∑
k;l
Pð1;kÞð2;lÞ þP
ð2;lÞ
ð1;kÞ;
〈ðΔvÞ2〉¼ 1
N2
hvvðr;u; vÞ ¼
1
N2
∑
k;l
Pðk;1Þðl;2Þ þP
ðl;2Þ
ðk;1Þ;
〈ΔrΔu〉¼ 1
N2
hruðr;u; vÞ ¼
1
N2
∑
ka l
Pðk;1Þðl;1Þ P
ðk;2Þ
ðl;2Þ ;
〈ΔrΔv〉¼ 1
N2
hrvðr;u; vÞ ¼
1
N2
∑
ka l
Pð1;kÞð1;lÞ P
ð2;kÞ
ð2;lÞ ;
〈ΔuΔv〉¼ 1
N2
huvðr;u; vÞ ¼ 1
N2
∑
ka l
Pðk;kÞðl;lÞ P
ðl;kÞ
ðk;lÞ;
These are used for the diffusion terms in the Langevin equations.
Remember that the process is repeated N times in a unit time.
Assuming that N is sufﬁciently large, the central limit theorem
yields the Langevin equations as follows:
_r ¼ grðr;u; vÞþ
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p ζrðtÞ; ð7Þ
_u ¼ guðr;u; vÞþ
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p ζuðtÞ; ð8Þ
_v ¼ gvðr;u; vÞþ
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p ζvðtÞ: ð9Þ
Here, ζrðtÞ, ζuðtÞ and ζvðtÞ denote Gaussian white noise with
〈ζrðtÞ〉¼ 〈ζuðtÞ〉¼ 〈ζvðtÞ〉¼ 0;
〈ζrðtÞζrðt0Þ〉¼ ðhrrg2r Þ δðtt0Þ;
〈ζuðtÞζuðt0Þ〉¼ ðhuug2uÞ δðtt0Þ;
〈ζvðtÞζvðt0Þ〉¼ ðhvvg2v Þ δðtt0Þ;
〈ζrðtÞζuðt0Þ〉¼ ðhrugrguÞ δðtt0Þ;
〈ζrðtÞζvðt0Þ〉¼ ðhrvgrgvÞ δðtt0Þ;
〈ζuðtÞζvðt0Þ〉¼ ðhuvgugvÞ δðtt0Þ:
These noises are demographic stochasticity and should be inter-
preted in Ito's sense. Assuming that the system size N is sufﬁ-
ciently large leads to the deviations of u and v that are sufﬁciently
small. Under this assumption, we disregard the effects of the
deviations of u and v on the noise terms. For an example,
〈ζrðtÞζrðt0Þ〉¼ ðhrrðr;u; vÞg2r ðr;u; vÞÞδðtt0Þ can be approximated
by ðhrrðr;0;0Þg2r ðr;0;0ÞÞδðtt0Þ. The other correlations of the
noise terms can be approximated in the same manner. A simple
calculation yields the following equations:
hrrg2r  hrrðr;0;0Þg2r ðr;0;0Þ
¼ fpqþð1pÞð1qÞþrgfpð1qÞþð1pÞqrg; ð10Þ
huug2u  huuðr;0;0Þg2uðr;0;0Þ ¼ pð1pÞ; ð11Þ
hvvg2v  hvvðr;0;0Þg2v ðr;0;0Þ ¼ qð1qÞ; ð12Þ
huvgugv  huvðr;0;0Þguðr;0;0Þgvðr;0;0Þ ¼
r
2
; ð13Þ
hrugrgu  hruðr;0;0Þgrðr;0;0Þguðr;0;0Þ ¼ ð12pÞqð1qÞ;
ð14Þ
hrvgrgv  hrvðr;0;0Þgrðr;0;0Þgvðr;0;0Þ ¼ ð12qÞpð1pÞ:
ð15Þ
Thus, the correlations of noise ζu and ζv are approximated by
〈ζuðtÞζuðt0Þ〉¼ pð1pÞδðtt0Þ;
〈ζvðtÞζvðt0Þ〉¼ qð1qÞδðtt0Þ;
〈ζuðtÞζvðt0Þ〉¼
r
2
δðtt0Þ:
This approximation and linearizing Eqs. (8) and (9) yield
_u
_v
 
¼ J u
v
 
þ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
ζuðtÞ
ζvðtÞ
 !
ð16Þ
where J is the Jacobi matrix of Eqs. (8) and (9) at ðu; vÞ ¼ ð0;0Þ:
J ¼
∂gu
∂u
∂gu
∂v
∂gv
∂u
∂gv
∂v
0
BB@
1
CCA¼ω
Φpð1pÞ Ψ r
2
Φ
r
2
Ψqð1qÞ
0
B@
1
CA:
Because N is sufﬁciently large, we can assume that the motion of
r is rather slow and the time taken to reach one of the boundaries
of L is sufﬁciently long. Thus, the asymptotic solution of the linear
Langevin equation (16) is given as
uðtÞ
vðtÞ
 !
¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
Z t
1
eJðt sÞ
ξuðsÞ
ξvðsÞ
 !
ds: ð17Þ
Based on a simple algebra, it is shown that u and v obey the two-
dimensional normal distribution with zero mean:
1
2π
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
jΓ j
p exp 1
2
ðu; vÞΓ1 u
v
  
where Γ is the covariance matrix of u and v:
Γ ¼ u
2 uv
uv v2
 !* +
¼  1
2Nω
1
Φ
0
0
1
Ψ
0
BB@
1
CCA: ð18Þ
For the next step, we approximate grðr;u; vÞ by 〈grðr;u; vÞ〉u;v in
order to exclude u and v from the Langevin equation of r (Eq. (7)).
By using Eq. (18), we obtain
〈grðr;u; vÞ〉u;v ¼
1
N
rþ1
2
ð12pÞð12qÞ
 
:
Finally, Eq. (7) can be approximated by
〈_r〉u;v ¼
1
N
rþ1
2
ð12pÞð12qÞ
 
þ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p ζrðtÞ ð19Þ
where ζrðtÞ denotes Gaussian white noise with
〈ζrðtÞ〉¼ 0;
〈ζrðtÞζrðt0Þ〉¼ fpqþð1pÞð1qÞþrgfpð1qÞþð1pÞqrgδðtt0Þ:
In contrast to the case of an inﬁnite population, Eq. (19) indicates that
the neutrality on L vanishes and the motion of r is not a simple
randomwalk. The drift term of Eq. (19) is positive (negative) when r is
larger (smaller) than rn ¼ 12 ð12pÞð12qÞ. Thus, the equilibrium
point rn is unstable in Eq. (19) (see Fig. 5). The order of the drift term is
Oð1=NÞ, whereas that of the diffusion term is Oð1=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
Þ. Therefore, the
ﬂow by the drift term is obscured by the diffusion when the
population size is large. However, if the population size is not large,
distinct trends of behaviors can be observed as demonstrated by the
numerical simulations in Section 3.
Fig. 5. A schematic view of the drift term of Eq. (19).
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Note that from Eq. (4), it is obvious that 〈Δr〉 is always zero
when ðu; vÞ ¼ ð0;0Þ (i.e., the system state is precisely on L) regard-
less of the value of r. Therefore, when the system state is precisely
on L, the expected motion of r is neutral. However, constantly
occurring perturbation by ﬁnite size effect causes 〈u2〉 and 〈v2〉 to
be non-zero, making ﬂow presented in Fig. 5 in the expected
motion of r. In this manner, emergence of such ﬂow is a somewhat
indirect effect of ﬁniteness of the system size.
2.5. Strategy linkage between the two games
On L, r measures the linkage between the strategies of the two
games. xij ¼ yizj holds if r¼0, that is,there is no linkage between the
strategies of the two games. When r is positively larger, a player
playing strategy-1 (strategy-2) in game-α also plays strategy-1
(strategy-2) in game-β with a higher probability and vice versa.
In such a case, the strategies of the two games are positively linked
in the population. On the other hand, when r is negatively larger, a
player playing strategy-1 (strategy-2) in game-α plays strategy-2
(strategy-1) in game-β with higher probability and vice versa; in
such a case, the strategies of the two games are negatively linked.
Because the labels of the strategies can be assigned arbitrarily, we
can assume that p; qr12 without the loss of generality. This
assumption means that in each game, the minor strategy at the
equilibrium point is labeled strategy-1 and the major one is labeled
strategy-2. Here, we show that the system state tends to have
positive linkage under this condition. We can also assume that prq.
Even if p4q, game-α and game-β just need to be relabeled to
satisfy this assumption. These assumptions yield the following
equations: pqrpð1qÞr ð1pÞqr ð1pÞð1qÞ. Therefore, non-
negativity of xij indicates that the boundaries of L are ð0q p1pqÞ
and ð pqp 01qÞ. Thus, the range of r is given by
rLrrrrH ; ðrL ¼ 2pq; rH ¼ 2pð1qÞÞ:
rL and rH correspond to RL and RH in Fig. 3, respectively. Since
p; qr12 , rn is always non-positive and the midpoint of L is always
non-negative (i.e., rnr0r ðrLþrHÞ=2¼ pð12qÞ). Thus, the position
of rn on L can typically be depicted as Fig. 6(a). Furthermore, if
pþqo12 is satisﬁed, rn is lesser than rL and in such a case, the drift
term in Eq. (19) is always set to be positive regardless of the value of
r, as presented in Fig. 6(b). Such an obvious asymmetry of ﬂow
introduces a particular trend in the system. If the initial state is
chosen randomly, then it is clear that the system state goes to the
higher boundary of L with a higher probability than the lower
boundary. The population tends to have minor–minor and major–
major linkages between the strategies of the two games.
Additionally, let us consider the rare mutation of strategies.
Mutation restores extinct strategies and makes the system ergodic.
Therefore, the system state can be observed to make round trips
along L repeatedly. Obviously, states around ð pqp 01qÞ are observed
more often than ð0q p1pqÞ. This indicates that the population with
positive linkage is observed more often than that with negative
linkage. Although it is difﬁcult to analytically derive the frequen-
cies of the periods to stay around the lower and higher boundaries,
we will conﬁrm this bias with a numerical simulation in Section 3.
Fig. 6. Schematic views of the drift term in Eq. (19). Since p; qr12, rnr0r
ðrLþrHÞ=2 is always satisﬁed. (a) When pþqZ12, rn is between rL and r¼0.
(b) Otherwise, rn is under rL.
Fig. 7. Time series of r in the systemwith mutation are plotted. The payoff matrices
of the games are set A¼ ð 00:8 0:20 Þ and B¼ ð 00:7 0:30 Þ. Thus, p¼0.2 and q¼0.3. Moreover,
the selection intensity is ω¼ 0:5 and mutation rate is μ¼ 5 105. The number of
individuals is 500, 1000 and 2000 in (a), (b), and (c), respectively. The initial states
are all set at ðx11x21
x12
x22
Þ ¼ ð pqð1pÞq pð1qÞð1pÞð1qÞÞ. The dashed lines represent rHð ¼ 0:28Þ and
rLð ¼ 0:12Þ. The upper one is rH and the other is rL.
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3. Numerical simulations
Here, we demonstrate the tendency of the motion of r with
several numerical simulations.
3.1. Round trips along L
To conﬁrm the discussion in the last of the previous section,
let us introduce mutation into the system. In each iteration of the
process, a randomly chosen individual replaces his/her strategy
with another strategy with a certain small probability μ. Since
mutation makes the system ergodic, the system state shows round
trips along L repeatedly. Therefore, we can observe the tendency of
the motion. In Fig. 7, the time series of r in several population sizes
are plotted. r ﬂuctuates around rH and rL and move back and forth
between them repeatedly. We can clearly observe that r takes
more time to ﬂuctuate around rH than around rL in all plots.
As Eq. (19) suggests, this trend is observed more distinctly in a
smaller population.
3.2. Direction of ﬂow at ðr;u; vÞ ¼ ð0;0;0Þ
Second, we calculate the expected values of r at t ¼ 18 starting
from ðr;u; vÞ ¼ ð0;0;0Þ at t¼0 for a set of various (p,q). Eq. (19)
indicates that if both p and q are larger or smaller than 12 , 〈rðtÞ〉 is
positive, otherwise, 〈rðtÞ〉 is negative. A probability distribution, the
initial distribution of which is concentrated on ðr;u; vÞ ¼ ð0;0;0Þ, is
updated N  18 times with transition probabilities given by Eq. (2);
subsequently, 〈rðt ¼ 1=8Þ〉 is evaluated with the distribution at t ¼ 18
and plotted in Fig. 8. As expected from Eq. (19), Fig. 8 shows that
when p and q are both larger or smaller than 12 , 〈r〉 is positive;
otherwise, 〈r〉 is negative.
To justify the framework of our analysis, let us compare the
values obtained by the numerical simulations with analytically
approximated values. Since the period from t¼0 to t ¼ 18 is too
short to use Eq. (19) as it is without any modiﬁcations, we here
derive the approximated value of 〈rðt ¼ 1=8Þ〉 with the condition
ðrð0Þ;uð0Þ; vð0ÞÞ ¼ ð0;0;0Þ. Since this initial state is a ﬁxed point,
diffusional effect dominates the dynamics when t is small. Thus,
the mean values of u2ðtÞ, v2ðtÞ, and uðtÞvðtÞ for to1 are simply
obtained from Eqs. (11), (12) and (13), respectively:
u2ðtÞ uðtÞvðtÞ
uðtÞvðtÞ v2ðtÞ
 !* +
¼ 1
N
pð1pÞ 0
0 qð1qÞ
 !
tþOðt2Þ: ð20Þ
Additionally, the mean values of rðtÞuðtÞ and rðtÞvðtÞ for t{1 are
also obtained from Eqs. (14) and (15), respectively:
rðtÞuðtÞ
rðtÞvðtÞ
 !* +
¼  1
N
pð1pÞð12qÞ
ð12pÞqð1qÞ
 !
tþOðt2Þ: ð21Þ
From Eqs. (20), (21) and (4), _r for to1 can be approximated by
_r ¼ ωt
N
fΦpð1pÞþΨqð1qÞgð12pÞð12qÞþOðt2Þþ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p ζrðtÞ:
ð22Þ
〈rðtÞ〉 can be approximated by integrating Eq. (22) as follows:
〈rðtÞ〉¼ ωt
2
2N
fΦpð1pÞþΨqð1qÞgð12pÞð12qÞþOðt3Þ: ð23Þ
Fig. 8 shows the approximation values calculated by Eq. (23). This
ﬁgure clearly indicates that the values obtained by the numerical
simulations are approximated effectively by Eq. (23).
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate a ﬁnite population with two games.
The setting of multigame is smallest and simplest, only two games
with only two strategies. Though, it is shown that a ﬁnite population
playing two Hawk and Dove games tends to evolve toward a speciﬁc
direction to form certain linkages between the strategies of the two
games. We found that although the two games are not related at all
and the strategy inheritance from parents to infants is just copying of
parent's strategies, a population tends to form linkages between the
strategies of the two games called minor–minor and major–major
linkage.
From the population genetics perspective, this means that two
loci, which determine an individual's traits that independently
contribute to its ﬁtness, may have a stronger tendency to form a
particular linkage disequilibrium without any particular genetic
mechanism in a smaller population. Although we focused on haploid
system in this paper, frequency-dependent stochastic processes in
ﬁnite diploid populations are also investigated recently in the context
of population genetics (Lessard, 2005; Hashimoto and Aihara, 2009;
Huang et al., 2012). Extending to diploid populations is important to
investigate biological systems while haploid populations are good
enough to investigate social games in human societies. By extending
the framework of this paper to diploid populations, more compli-
cated or non-trivial behaviors are expected. In diploid system,
recombination plays a signiﬁcant role to resolve linkage disequili-
brium. Relations between recombination and multigame effect in
ﬁnite populations could be a challenging topic in evolutionary game
dynamics.
From a social behavior perspective, the result, minor–minor and
major–major linkages, implies that, in some situations in a small
community, a person in the majority (minority) of a certain
classiﬁcation tends to be in the majority (minority) of another
classiﬁcation. It is not obvious whether this claim is right or not in
the context of social relations. However, at least, the result could
be a new clue to investigate a formation process of minority and
majority in a human community.
Fig. 8. The number of players is N ¼ 322 ¼ 1024. The expected values of r at t ¼ 18,
which start from ðr;u; vÞ ¼ ð0;0;0Þ at t¼0, are plotted for various (p,q). (p,q) is set at
ðp; qÞ ¼ ðP=32;Q=32Þ, ðP ¼ 1;…;31; Q ¼ 1;…;31Þ. The payoff matrices are given by
A¼ ð 01p p0Þ and B¼ ð 01q q0Þ here. The initial state ðN11N21
N12
N22
Þ (Nij is the number of (i,j)-
strategy players) corresponding to ðr;u; vÞ ¼ ð0;0;0Þ is ð PQð32PÞ Pð32Q Þð32PÞð32Q ÞÞ. The
colored surface represents the results of the numerical simulation and the red
lines are plotted by Eq. (23). Numerical simulation has been conducted as follows:
initially, a probability distribution on the system states that concentrated on
ð PQð32PÞ Pð32Q Þð32PÞð32Q ÞÞ is prepared and updated 128ð ¼N  18Þ times with the transition
probabilities given in Eq. (2); subsequently, 〈rðt ¼ 1=8Þ〉 is evaluated with the
distribution at t ¼ 18.
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Furthermore, more complicated situations, such as games that
have three or more strategies, populations that play three or more
games, could be investigated in future studies.
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